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View of the Market
Coase assumes a static market that is specialized but does
not allow for increased specialization unless somehow
spontaneously organized through the price mechanism.
Williamson’s firm is created around profoundly special-
ized resources that cannot be traded in the market, which
allows for a dynamic adoption of increased specialization
and more roundabout production processes.
Firm Structure
Coase’s firm fundamentally resembles market coordination
both in terms of allocation and specialization degree, which
means it is different only in means of coordination.
Williamson’s firm is structurally different from market
coordination. Characterized by extra-market specialization,
it can utilize innovations and novel production structures.
Introduction
Objectives
i. To identify assumptions in and compare/contrast 
Coasean and Williamsonian transaction cost 
approaches;
ii. To identify and estimate the role of specialization in 
transaction cost analysis of economic organization.
Conceptual Framework
Specialization, in the form of division of labor and capital, 
is a fundamental prerequisite for and characteristic of the 
market/exchange economy, the extent of which is limited 
by the extent of the market—its density of resources 
(Smith; Durkheim; Stigler). Specialization in the market 
place is characterized by and leads to resource 
heterogeneity (Barney), primarily measured or 
operationalized as a resource’s degree of complementarity
and substitutability (Lachmann). The specialized market 
economy is characterized by increasing heterogeneity and 
more roundabout production structures.
Limitations in previous research
i. Lack of analysis of specialization’s impact on economic 
organization—despite Coase explicitly assuming a 
specialized market economy and Williamson focusing 
on asset specificity;
ii. Few and limited attempts to identify core assumptions 
in and compare Coase’s and Williamson’s respective 
transaction cost approaches;
iii. General but seemingly unsubstantiated presumption of 
a commensurable, joint Coase-Williamson transaction 
cost approach (however with differing emphases).
Main Contributions
i. Identification and explication of significant role of 
specialization in both Coase and Williamson;
ii. Identification and explication of potentially conflicting 
assumptions in and implications for Coase’s and 
Williamson’s respective approaches;
iii. Drafting a potential solution based on the conception of 
specialization as resource heterogeneity and the firm as 
islands of comparatively extreme density. 
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Coase’s View
Transaction Costs 
The “costs of using the price mechanism,” “of discovering 
what the relevant prices are,” the “marketing costs” 
necessary to coordinate production processes under 
“atomistic competition.”
The Coasean Analysis
i. Market organizing is characterized by efficient 
allocation of resources through the price mechanism, 
but laden with transaction costs;
ii. Firms are “islands of conscious power” where an 
entrepreneur-coordinator directs factors of production 
to, as far as possible, reproduce the market’s allocative 
efficiency, thereby saving transaction costs;
iii. The magnitude of market transaction costs depends on 
the individual entrepreneur’s location, while the firm’s 
internal transaction costs depend on the same 
entrepreneur’s managerial ability; firms therefore differ 
in both external and internal transaction costs;
iv. Firms are superior means of organizing where excess 
market transaction costs TC are greater than the value 
of the relative allocative inefficiency of direction-based 
organizing, Ae–As, i.e. where TC –( Ae–As) > 0 ;
v. A single firm is superior in the organizing of a 
transaction where it is at least as good as existing and 
potential competitors integrating similar transactions, 
i.e. a firm’s profitability requires that 
.
Structure of the Firm
By assumption, the Coasean firm cannot outdo the market’s 
allocative efficiency, but can potentially compensate by 
lower internal TC and/or higher technical efficiency.
Firm structure is similar to market allocation of 
resources to the extent the entrepreneur is able to reproduce 
market allocation using external prices.
Consequently, Coase’s firm “need imply no 
specialization” and likely cannot be created primarily 
around highly specific resources.
Williamson’s TCE
Transaction Costs 
Exist primarily as maladapation costs arising due to 
misaligned incentives, especially attributable to the risk for 
a contractual party’s opportunistic (mis)appropriation of 
quasi-rents from transaction-specific investments.
The Williamsonian Analysis
i. Economic organizing is a “problem of contracting” and 
the problem is to align transactions with transaction 
cost economizing governance structures;
ii. Transaction costs arise along the magnitudes of the 
“critical dimensions” of transactions: uncertainty, 
frequency, and asset specificity;
iii. Asset specificity is “by far” the most important 
predictor of hierarchy (authority-based/firm organizing) 
and high degrees of asset specificity (high 
complementarity, low substitutability) implies 
extractable quasi-rents due to much lower value of an 
asset’s secondary use.
Structure of the Firm
In equilibrium, all transactions are aligned with their 
optimal governance structures, which means that 
transactions utilizing resources with high asset specificity 
are expected primarily as integrated in hierarchies. 
It follows that integrated transactions involve 
comparatively highly complementary (c) and limitedly 
substitutable (s) resources, i.e. transactions within firms are 
more highly specialized (>g) in terms of relative 
complementarity than market-organized transactions.
TCi- ൫Ae - As, i൯ ≥ max൛TC-i-൫Ae - As,-i൯ൟ > 0
Implications for Research
The progress of the market can be explained using the
implications of specialization and insights into roles and
functions of governance structures from transaction cost
analysis. Highly complementary resources are integrated
in and adopted within
firms. Resource substitut-
ability is increased through
imitation by other firms in
the competitive market,
generating high resource
heterogeneity in a market
setting and higher growth
through the further division
of labor and capital.